The "new" school of genocide studies draws heavily on ideas that were first formulated within the context of the highly politicized French decolonization debate; prominent intellectual critics of colonialism such as Aimé Césaire, Octave Mannoni, and Frantz Fanon pointed to the enduring psychological deformation of the "colonial masters" and interpreted fascism as European colonialism turned inward. 8 As Aimé Césaire famously remarked in his Discours sur le colonialisme (1950), the white Christian bourgeois could not forgive Hitler for unleashing colonial violence within Europe and for treating the White Man in a manner previously reserved for Indians, Africans, and Arabs. 9 Even before Césaire, the African-American intellectual W. E. B. DuBois wrote in The World and Africa (1947) that "there was no Nazi atrocity-concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women, or ghastly blasphemy of children-which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against colored folks in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world."
10 In short, colonialism, as Jean-Paul Sartre famously argued, was a "boomerang" that returned to Europe in the form of fascism. Moses, "Conceptual Blockages," 34. Césaire, Discours, 10 f. 10 As quoted in Richard H. King, Race, Culture, and the Intellectuals, 1940 -1970 (Washington, D.C., and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004 See Sartre's foreword to Fanon, Les Damnés.
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The most intellectually influential interpretation of the connections between the era of imperialism and National Socialism was, however, offered in Hannah Arendt's masterpiece, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) , which offered a challenging (though not empirically proven) interpretation of the destructive effects of imperialism on normative political and moral values within Europe. According to Arendt, during the late nineteenth century, European imperialism served as a laboratory of amalgamated racial doctrines and anonymous bureaucratic policies that were based on "decrees" rather than the rule of law. These ideas and practices were subsequently reimported into Europe where they merged with a newly secularized and racialized anti-Semitism that went hand in hand with the völkisch nationalism promoted by pan-movements in the multiethnic empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria.
In recent years, Arendt's arguments have been rediscovered by various academic disciplines, ranging from postcolonial studies to genocide studies.
12
The current wave of scholarship has challenged many orthodoxies in the field of genocide studies and has uncovered stimulating new ways of overcoming Eurocentric perspectives on the history of mass killings. But the hypothesis of the Holocaust's non-European roots has also been taken too far, most notably in some of the most recent literature on the German "genocides" against the Herero and Nama in Southwest Africa between 1904 and 1907 and their alleged role as "models" for the Nazi war of extermination after 1939/41.
13
According to Jürgen Zimmerer, the most productive and challenging proponent of this particular argument, the connections between the "genocidal" war in German Southwest Africa and the Nazi war of extermination in east-central Europe go far beyond mere phenomenological similarities. Although Zimmerer has repeatedly distanced himself from any mono-causal explanations of the Holocaust, the apparent causal nexus between "Windhoek and Auschwitz" remains at his arguments' core, implying that, by ignoring the "African roots" of the Holocaust, international scholarship on the history of the Third Reich has overlooked a central element in explaining the Nazis' mass murder of European Jewry. The German colonial wars against the Herero and Nama represent, he argues, a "decisive link to the crimes of the Nazis" and were an "important source of ideas" for Germany's war of annihilation in eastern Europe after 1939/41. Both Germany's "obsession" with "space and race" and the fact that the expulsion and murder of the European Jews was not viewed as a "taboo violation" are represented as direct legacies of Germany's colonial past.
14 "The willingness to exterminate certain groups of people" is the "ultimate taboo violation," which first took shape in the colonies and ultimately assumed "its most radical form in the Holocaust." The campaign against the Herero was therefore "paradigmatic for the Nazi war of extermination": "even the murder of the Jews" would "probably not have been possible" without Germany's colonial experience. 15 The title of Zimmerer's most recent book, From Windhoek to Auschwitz, 16 suggests the Herero War as the starting point of a genocidal path that ended in the Holocaust, and represents the semantic climax of a thesis that challenges whole libraries of literature on reject the interpretations put forward in Horst Gründer and Gisela Graichen, eds., Deutsche Kolonien. Traum und Trauma, 5th ed. (Berlin: Ullstein, 2007 
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ROBERT GERWARTH AND STEPHAN MALINOWSKI the origins of the Holocaust as well as recent general histories of the Third Reich in which Germany's colonial past plays no role whatsoever.
17
Building on Zimmerer's articles as well as other ideas on "totalitarian continuities" between German Southwest Africa and Nazi Germany put forward by Henning Melber, 18 the American historian Benjamin Madley also suggested that the idea of Lebensraum and the concept of concentration camps was first tested in German Southwest Africa and that the Nazis "borrowed ideas and methods from the German Southwest African genocide that they then employed and expanded upon. Genocidal rhetoric, a new definition of Vernichtungskrieg, executing POWs, murdering civilians en masse, and deporting POWs and noncombatants to work and death camps were all introduced to modern German history through the Namibian colonial experience."
19
One problem with these arguments is that their chronological and spatial boundaries are not always clearly stated, making critical engagement difficult. In the majority of Zimmerer's numerous articles on the subject, the German war against the Herero and Nama takes center stage. 20 His key argument is that the war of 1904 and the accompanying or subsequent expulsion and extermination of the Herero and Nama in concentration camps represented an unprecedented "taboo violation" (the "first genocide of the twentieth century") and a new level of state-sponsored violence against civilians with devastating long-term effects. In other publications, however, the German colonial massacres of 1904 are for Zimmerer only one case among a number of historically and geographically diverse examples, suggesting the more encompassing nature of colonialism's destructive potential and legacy. Even within this considerably more expanded perspective, however, Zimmerer emphasizes the German war against the Herero and Nama as an "outstanding event in a global history of the unleashing of violence."
21
The idea of direct continuities of "colonial violence" from Windhoek to Auschwitz has received both support and sustained criticism. While Michael Brumlik has recently suggested that the "exemplary character of the German colonial wars" for the Nazis' extermination policy is "gaining increasing plausibility," 22 scholars such as Pascal Grosse and Birthe Kundrus have pointed to some important structural shortcomings of the continuity thesis. On the one hand, Grosse has emphasized that the peculiarities of German colonialism are to be found less in its violent suppression of indigenous uprisings than in its abrupt end in 1918. The Versailles Treaty made Germany a postcolonial power in a colonial world and contributed to the reorientation of colonial fantasies toward east-central Europe: "While the major colonial powers underwent a process of decolonization much later and as a result of independence movements in the colonies themselves, Germany was stripped of its colonial possessions as a direct consequence of its defeat in World War I, which left a complete vacuum in the sphere of expansionism exactly when expansionist aspirations had reached their height."
23 Kundrus, on the other hand, has convincingly argued that superficial phenomenological similarities between colonial and fascist violence should not be confused with direct lines of continuity and that colonial rhetoric is not the same as colonial policy.
24
Building on these first reactions, this essay will engage more systematically with the hypothesis of "connections" and structural similarities between "Windhoek and Auschwitz." First, it will critically examine the allegedly "exceptional" character of the German colonial wars within the broader transnational context of colonial violence, a context that was central to Hannah Arendt's arguments about the origins of totalitarianism. It argues that the "taboo violation" of 1904 was in fact very much in line with common European colonial standards and practices. Neither massacres of an indigenous population classified as "inferior" nor the scope, nature, and objectives of the violence unleashed in German Southwest Africa constituted genuinely "new" or exceptional levels of violence previously unknown to European colonialism. 
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ROBERT GERWARTH AND STEPHAN MALINOWSKI Second, the essay will highlight the lack of evidence for direct personal and structural continuities between Windhoek and Auschwitz. Rejecting some of the rather constructed continuity arguments that have been suggested so far, it will be argued instead that National Socialism and the German war of annihilation constituted a break with European traditions of colonialism rather than a continuation.
Ã Ã Ã
If Hannah Arendt's hypothesis about the colonial roots of European fascism is to serve as a genuine starting point for an investigation into the interconnectedness of colonialism and fascism, then the inter-and transnational nature of colonial violence must remain at the center of any analytical framework. The assertion of a peculiar German "taboo violation" in Southwest Africa that consisted of the declared intention of "exterminating a certain group of people" may appear plausible within a nation-centric framework of investigation, but it is highly questionable when placed within the broader context of western colonialism. 25 Unlike some scholars in recent years, Hannah Arendt never advocated the notion that "taboo violations" and colonial careers, institutional practices, and mentalities reached all the way from the Waterberg to Auschwitz. On the contrary, in her chapter, "Race-Thinking before Racism," Arendt explicitly argues that neither the Germans nor the Nazis invented racial theories. The continuing appeal of Arendt's interpretation partly stems from the fact that she analyzed anti-Semitism, racism, and colonialism as transnational, European phenomena. Her focus on elements of totalitarian rule (a word that was omitted from the English title of Elemente und Ursprünge totalitärer Herrschaft), whose effects could be felt at different times and in different places, is one of the study's great strengths. In Arendt's analysis, Gobineau and Rhodes, Conrad and Kipling are more important than Trotha, Maercker, and Epp. The relevance of the German colonial experience is outweighed by the Boers, the building of the Suez Canal, the "alliance between capital and the mob," as well as by the attempt to reorder "humanity into master and slave races."
26 All of these ideas and violent colonial practices existed long before General von Trotha unleashed his extermination campaign against the Hereros. Transgressions of "civilized warfare" in the colonial sphere were common currency among Europe's colonial powers, and it is no coincidence that Joseph Conrad's frequently invoked metaphor of the "heart of darkness," which originally referred to the Belgian Congo, quickly became the international synonym par excellence for parallel colonial universes of violent suppression and exploitation. Even defenders of the "positive achievements" of colonialism do not deny that the violent usurpation of land and resources, the systematic destruction of the economic and cultural infrastructure of the vanquished, and the introduction of racist legislation by European colonial powers were standard procedure rather than an exceptional "taboo violation." 27 Three cases of colonial mass violence may suffice as examples to illustrate this point: the American conquest of the Philippines, the Spanish colonial wars in Cuba, and the French massacres in nineteenth-century Algeria.
28
The American conquest and colonization of the Philippines between 1898 and 1902 and the ensuing expulsion and extermination of an indigenous civilization defined along racist criteria reveal several structural similarities with the subsequent events in German Southwest and Southeast Africa. A number of military orders exist that can be seen as the functional equivalents of Lothar von Trotha's frequently quoted "extermination order" of 1904, including Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith's order that "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States." Smith had previously described how his experiences in the wars against Native Americans had taught him how to combat "savages" and threatened to transform the entire region into a "howling wilderness." 29 When, like Trotha in 1904, Smith was asked to clarify his order, he said that every person over the age of ten was to be shot.
30
In quantitative terms, the American colonial massacre (to which Rudyard Kipling dedicated his frequently quoted poem The White Man's Burden) exceeded the death rates in German Southwest Africa many times over. 31 It resulted in the deaths of some 4,000 Americans, 20,000 Philippine soldiers, and between 27 Daniel Lefeuvre, Chère Algérie: La France et sa colonie , 1862 -1902 ," Military Affairs 43 (1979 . Jacob "Howling Wilderness" Smith, as he was later called, was put on trial for war crimes in 1902, but was subsequently dismissed from the army without a conviction. As in the case of von Trotha, the civil institutions intervened too late. 
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ROBERT GERWARTH AND STEPHAN MALINOWSKI 250,000 and 750,000 civilians. 32 In explaining the vastly greater number of Philippine "casualties," the commanding general, Arthur MacArthur, stated that whites were less likely to succumb to their wounds than members of lower races.
33
A useful conceptual tool in this context is the notion of a common western "colonial archive," to be understood as common knowledge on the treatment, exploitation, and extermination of "sub-humans" accumulated by the western powers over the course of colonial history. Once established, the knowledge accumulated in the "colonial archive" could be "activated" in different geographical areas. 34 The fact that twenty-six of the thirty U.S. generals operating in the Philippines had gathered previous combat experience in the wars of annihilation against the Native Americans and explicitly referred to aspects of this warfare against "savages" as an important learning process for the Philippine campaign exemplifies the transcontinental character of this colonial archive.
35
In a Senate hearing on the atrocities in the Philippines, MacArthur himself emphasized the transnational character of colonial practices: "Many thousands of years ago our Aryan ancestors raised cattle, made a language, multiplied in numbers, and overflowed. By due process of expansion to the west they occupied Europe, developed arts and sciences, and created a great civilization, which, separating into innumerable currents, inundated and fertilized the globe with blood and ideas, the primary bases of all human progress, incidentally crossing the Atlantic and thereby reclaiming, populating, and civilizing a hemisphere. The broad actuating laws which underlie all these wonderful phenomena are still operating with relentless vigor and have recently forced one of the currents of this magnificent Aryan people across the Pacific-that is to say, back almost to the cradle of its race-thus initiating a stage of progressive social evolution which may reasonably be expected to result in substantial contributions on behalf of the unity of the race and the brotherhood of man." 36 MacArthur's emphasis on the Aryan "civilizing mission" in particular underlines the transnational nature of the colonial archive. Similar observations can be made for the Spanish-Cuban war between 1895 and 1898. Before the commanding Spanish general Valeriano Weyler started his infamous "reconcentration" program, which herded much of the rural population into Spanish-held towns and which cost the lives of at least 155,000 Cuban civilians, he had gathered experience in suppressing and exterminating indigenous populations in the Spanish-occupied Philippines. The parallels with the German (and American) case go beyond the use of extreme violence against a local population. Just like von Trotha's (and MacArthur's) extermination campaign, Weyler's actions met with fierce criticism from parts of the Spanish public, and in 1887 Valeriano "The Butcher" Weyler was replaced with a more moderate military commander who abandoned the Spanish camp system.
37
Weyler's concentration camps soon, however, assumed a prominent place in the European colonial archive. By 1900, the Spanish term reconcentración had already been translated into English and was used to describe British "concentration camps," initiated by Lord Kitchener during the Second Boer War in South Africa (1899 -1902) . Just like Weyler in Cuba, Kitchener had become increasingly frustrated with the Boers' guerrilla tactics and duly "concentrated" native civilians into camps in order to deprive the enemy combatants of shelter and support. Once again, misery and famine as well as soaring mortality rates were the result. The connection between the South African camps and the Cuban camps was clear to contemporaries; at the time, the British were both praised and attacked by the international press for adapting "General Weyler's methods" to the Transvaal. 38 Shortly afterward, the American army used concentration camps for Philippine civilians, particularly in the rebellious province of Batangas, where the vigorous implementation of a policy of reconcentración led to horrific death rates among the civilian population. 39 Two years later, the 
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ROBERT GERWARTH AND STEPHAN MALINOWSKI same "successful" policy was adopted in another colonial setting, German Southwest Africa.
40
Racist discourses and the administrative planning and execution of policies of colonial conquest, expulsion, and extermination can, however, be traced back even further. In the French conquest of Algeria, to name a third example, estimates of the (largely civilian) victims between 1830 and 1872 range from 250,000 to 900,000. 41 Here, too, the murder of civilian men, women, and children, and the systematic destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods were standard practice for decades. In 1841, General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud proclaimed the long-term aim of the Algerian extermination campaign by stating that "the goal is not to persecute the Arabs, which would be entirely useless. The point is to prevent the Arabs from sowing, harvesting, pasturing, using their fields. Swarm out every year and burn their harvest. Or else exterminate them all to the last man."
42
The American and French cases in particular illustrate that colonial violence was by no means confined to authoritarian states. Quite the opposite: the states with the longest and ultimately most violent colonial record-France, Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands-remained democracies throughout the twentieth century, thus confirming rather than contradicting Alexis de Tocqueville's famous observations about the expansionist and potentially violent nature of democracies.
43
The thesis of the unique quality and significance of the German colonial massacres in Africa is therefore difficult to uphold. If one rejects the hypothetical possibility of a German colonial Sonderweg and interprets the use of colonial violence as a common European legacy, the issue of direct continuities becomes much more complicated. Why are the countries with the longest and (over the course of centuries) most violent colonial traditions not identical with those countries that unleashed the greatest degree of racist destruction both at home and abroad after 1918? If the intensive experience of colonial subjugation and extermination contributes to an individual and institutional brutalization that can be transferred back to Europe, then the discrepancies between England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the one hand, and Germany (and one could also add Austria) on the other are difficult to explain. In other words, the hypothesis of unbroken continuities between "Africa and Auschwitz" fails to account for the fact that Britain and France practiced policies of violent colonial suppression long before (and after) 1945, but simultaneously remained the bastions of democracy and never pursued policies of genocide within Europe.
In a cautious attempt to explain this discrepancy, Dirk Schumann has recently argued that the relative domestic stability of interwar France and Britain (relative, that is, when measured against the situation in Germany) was partly due to the fact that their violent potential was relieved in the colonies, an option no longer available to Germany after 1918. 44 This argument complements Pascal Grosse's suggestion that while there "was probably no innate difference" between European colonialisms before 1914, there "certainly was in their experience of decolonization." In Grosse's view, Germany's unique experience of decolonization and its "colonialism without colonies" after 1918 became a "fundamental factor in the interwar radicalization of pre-World War I ideas and practices of expansionist biopolitics."
45
Even if one does not subscribe to an interpretation of National Socialism as a substitute for lost opportunities to "discharge" violence in the colonies or view World War II as a "recolonization" conflict, Schumann's and Grosse's interventions point to experiences of violence between Windhoek and Auschwitz that were of crucial significance for the personal development and careers of future protagonists in the Third Reich, but which are largely absent in the debate about continuities between 1904 and 1941. What is surprising about the course of the current debate on the continuation of colonial traditions by Nazi Germany is the extent to which World War I has been neglected. 46 The experience of the Great War, during which both qualitatively and quantitatively new dimensions of extermination were attained, the special forms the war assumed in the east as well as the years of border fighting, civil wars, and Freikorps campaigns that profoundly impacted east-central Europe between 1918 and 1923, play no role whatsoever in any of the studies advocating direct lines of continuity between Windhoek and Auschwitz. Instead, it is implicitly assumed that a genocidal German military machine stopped at the Waterberg and went into gear again during the attack on Poland and the Soviet Union, this time backed by a "strong state." Yet it can reasonably be 44 Dirk Schumann, "Europa, der erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit. Eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?," Journal of Modern European History 1 (2003): 23-43. 45 Grosse, "German Colonialism," 118-119.
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Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, and Irina Renz, eds., "Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch." Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen: Klartext, 1993); Gerhard Hirschfeld et al., eds., Kriegserfahrungen. Studien zur Sozial-und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen: Klartext, 1997).
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argued that the roots of Germany's deviation from the path of other European colonial powers should not be sought in the year 1904 but rather in the immediate postwar period. Alongside the Great War, the experiences of defeat, revolution, and civil war retain a central significance in explaining an enhanced potential for and willingness to use violence. 47 It is no coincidence that the greatest destructive potential after 1918 emanated from those revisionist states that were either among the "official" losers of World War I or, in the case of Italy, considered themselves to have won the war but lost the peace.
Another important objection to the continuity argument is the lack of direct personal linkages between 1904 and 1939/41. A twenty-year-old soldier, who participated in the mass killings of the Herero and Nama and who survived World War I, would have been a sixty-year-old man during the Nazis' Operation Barbarossa. The commanding officers of the 1904 campaign were born between the 1840s and 1860s. Assuming that they were still alive at the beginning of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union, they would have been between eighty and ninety years old. Previous studies have sought to bridge this "gap" between 1904 and 1941 by pointing to "knowledge transfers" from one generation to the next. Benjamin Madley, for example, has suggested that the Auschwitz doctor Josef Mengele was profoundly influenced by the anthropologist Eugen Fischer, who had conducted racial field studies in Southwest Africa in 1908. He also argued that Hermann Göring became a proponent of colonialism (in his case of eastern Europe) through his father, the first German Reichskommisar of German Southwest Africa (1885 -91). However important these findings may be, the exact significance of such influences on the future careers of prominent Nazis is impossible to measure.
48 "Traditions" and "knowledge" can certainly be handed down from one generation to another, yet as easy as it is to assume the existence of "teacher-student relationships" and indirect transmissions of genocidal practices within the framework of individual or institutional memory, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact impact of such influences on individual careers and mentalities.
49 "Students" generally have more than one teacher, and institutions feed their "collective memory" from a vast pool of different traditions.
Even if it is possible to trace a handful of violent careers between Windhoek and Auschwitz, it is unclear what the depiction of twenty or even two hundred such military careers can contribute to our understanding of the German war of extermination. Even in the highly unlikely event that all of the few thousand veterans of Southwest Africa participated in the German war effort on the Eastern Front, they would have been a marginally small group within a Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz, [450] [451] [452] [453] [454] [455] [456] [457] Zimmerer, "The Birth of the 'Ostland, [213] [214] [215] [216] [217] [218] German army that already amounted to roughly three million men at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. 50 The quantitative ratio alone raises questions about the impact that Germany's African experiences of violence could have had on this enormous invasion army and its military leaders. Advocates of the continuity hypothesis have often referred to the case of Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, a former colonial officer, Freikorps leader, and subsequent director of the Third Reich's Colonial Office, as "living proof " of continuities between Africa and the Third Reich. Yet Epp had no influence on the extermination policies of the Third Reich whatsoever and was increasingly marginalized after the abandonment of the Madagascar Plan, a process that culminated in the dissolution of the Colonial Office in 1943. 51 To what extent the far more influential Reich Security Main Office's fanaticized personnel, who were directly responsible for the planning and execution of the "Final Solution," was influenced by knowledge of the German colonial massacres in Africa and the ideological concepts underpinning Wilhelmine colonialism remains an open question. Thus far the flourishing field of Nazi perpetrator studies has revealed no evidence of the significance of African colonial traditions for the radicalization of this Generation des Unbedingten. with a handful of men, so will we rule this colonial space of ours." 53 Yet, as Birthe Kundrus has argued convincingly, colonial rhetoric should not be confused with colonial practices. Far more striking than a few rhetorical references to British colonialism by Hitler, Himmler, and others are the structural differences between European colonial rule and the Nazi war of annihilation concealed by such misleading colonial fantasies. Hitler's verbal references to India, for example, may have reflected his admiration for Britain's ability to rule the world's largest empire with a handful of colonial officers, but they hardly constitute proof of the argument that Hitler pursued colonial policies in eastern Europe. Regardless of the numerous puppet regimes that were set up in some German-occupied territories (such as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia), Nazi Germany de facto never implemented a policy of indirect rule in any part of occupied eastern Europe. From the interwar period in particular, Britain (and to a lesser extent France) promoted the systematic "westernization" of small indigenous elites in order to raise standards of efficiency and to facilitate trade, while at the same time violently suppressing uprisings against colonial rule.
54 It is difficult to find analogies in the German war of extermination to this combination of development and force so characteristic of late western European colonialism. "Development" in Poland, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, for example, meant the physical annihilation of the indigenous elite, and no member of this elite was ever able to follow the example of Nehru or Gandhi by studying law at the best universities of the "colonial motherland." This observation extends to the countless collaborators from the Ukraine, Latvia, and elsewhere who were welcome to support the German crusade against "Judeo-Bolshevism" as willing executioners, but whose place in the Nazi postwar order was never clearly defined.
Although mass killings of indigenous civilians in the context of conquest of new territories and the suppression of resistance constituted a recurring pattern in the history of western colonialism, it is certainly wrong to suggest that "colonialism" is synonymous with extermination. 55 During the German war in east-central Europe, on the other hand, the policy of the extermination of "racially inferior" populations was not a means to bring the war to a triumphant end or to "restore order," but an end in itself. It constituted the very purpose of the entire Operation Barbarossa and the Generalplan Ost. An equally important difference between colonialism and Nazi Germany lies in the crucial role of settler communities in bringing about military confrontations in extra-European settings. 56 Colonial wars and colonial massacres (including those against the Herero and Nama) were particularly common and brutal where a small minority of white settlers felt existentially threatened by indigenous resistance against their rule. In the case of the German attack on Poland, however, there was no "thin white line," no settler minorities that stood in conflict with an indigenous population. On the contrary, throughout the German military campaign, the aim was to expel or exterminate the indigenous population before "Aryan" settlers moved into the east.
57
Advocates of the thesis of structural parallels between colonialism and fascism have attempted to explain the numerous quantitative and qualitative differences between the violence unleashed in 1904 and 1939/41 by suggesting that the key difference is to be found in the more developed bureaucratic terror apparatus of the Third Reich. 58 Neglected in this perspective is the complete absence of a "critical public" and (potentially moderating) civil institutions in the Third Reich. Massacres of indigenous populations in the colonies were frequently criticized in the contemporary press or in the parliaments in London, Paris, or Berlin (often leading to the dismissal of the officers in charge). Even if those interventions came too late for the victims, for example in the case of German Southwest Africa (or indeed in the cases of the Spanish war on Cuba and the American-Philippine War), it is important to acknowledge the existence of civil institutions that were willing and able to intervene in colonial massacres. Lothar von Trotha, whose military orders were largely responsible for the escalation of mass violence in German Southwest Africa, had influential and 56 secondary importance to historians. It may in fact distract from the far more important historiographical task of explaining how and why European states at different times unleashed campaigns of mass violence against populations they considered "inferior."
Furthermore, the German "taboo violation" of 1904 must be placed more consistently within the European or "western" context of violent colonial practices than has thus far been the case. Mass killings of indigenous civilian populations previously classified as racially or culturally "inferior" were common currency in Europe's colonial empires and are not indicative of a German colonial Sonderweg. The post-1945 colonial wars and massacres, such as those in Madagascar (1947) , Kenya (1952 -60), and Algeria (1954 -62) , suggest that even full knowledge of the Holocaust was no guarantee against a certain type of colonial warfare.
Half a century after the publication of the The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt's thesis of racist imperialism as a laboratory for totalitarianism continues to pose an intellectual challenge for historians of the Third Reich. 68 Despite the doubts about direct linkages between "Windhoek and Auschwitz" expressed in this essay, it remains plausible to assume that the ideas and practices that characterized Europe's colonial mastery over the world had some repercussions on innerEuropean history and that "knowledge transfers" occurred in some areas (such as eugenics and "racial hygiene," settlement planning, and racist legislation). But the extent to which these transfers affected the decision-making processes that led to the Holocaust has thus far not been convincingly demonstrated. Further empirical studies on eugenics and racist anthropology will be needed to determine the exact impact of such knowledge transfers. 69 Here, too, it will be important to remember that the other colonial powers had been active in these fields just as intensely as (and considerably longer than) Germany.
The examination of such transfers calls for an approach that can encompass both the common construction of a European colonial archive and its very different applications in various geographical contexts. Such an approach 68 "colonial conflict"-the culmination point of a genocidal path that originated in Africa and ended in Auschwitz. Compared to the construction of direct continuities between the German colonial wars of 1904 -1907 
